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CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-
TION. By Charles Fried. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 1981. Pp. 162. $14. 
In Contract as Promise: A Theory oJ Contractual Obligation, Charles 
Fried argues that the moral basis of contract law is lodged in the promise 
principle, "that principle by which persons may impose on themselves obli-
gations where none existed before" (p. 1). Fried's argument has two objec-
tives: to trace the complex legal institution of contract to a few basic moral 
principles and to reveal the underlying structure of that legal institution. In 
pursuing the former objective, Fried addresses his fellow legal theorists, 
while in pursuing the latter he directs his thesis primarily at students of 
contract law (Preface). Because Fried consciously addresses these two very 
different audiences, his work is at once rich in legal theory and accessible to 
those without prior exposure to legal philosophy. 
Fried pursues these purposes against the background of recent legal 
scholarship hostile to classical theories of contractual liability. The author 
advocates his view of contract as a corollary of promissory morality as an 
alternative to reductionist claims1 that contracts do not create new obliga-
tions. Fried meticulously concedes the appropriateness of viewing certain 
kinds of claims formally sounding in contract as species of tort claims. In-
deed, much of Fried's defense of the classical approach depends on his ar-
gument that misguided efforts to extend contractual liability to wrongs 
more properly viewed as torts are responsible for discrediting contractual 
liability in general. But Fried insists that contracts do give rise to obliga-
tions independently of externally imposed duties, regardless of the useful-
ness of tort-oriented remedies as an adjunct to contract law. 
Fried begins his analysis by incorporating David Hume's definition of a 
civilized society as one based on security of the person, stability of property, 
and the obligation on contract (p. 1).2 The first two bases are encompassed 
by property law, which defines the boundaries of our rightful possessions, 
and by tort law, which attempts to make us whole when these boundaries, 
or those of our physical person, are violated. The respect for the person and 
property of others, which we cherish as the source of our own autonomy, 
makes other people unique in the universe by placing them beyond our 
exploitation. The law of contracts extends even further. While preserving 
the main premise of liberal individualism - that individuals have rights -
the law of contracts permits individuals to dispose of their rights as they 
choose (pp. 1-2). 
The definition of morality as respect for the person and property of 
others coupled with the realization that contractual obligations are basically 
self-imposed (pp. 2, 7-8) led to the "crucial moral discovery" that morality 
could be enlisted not only to assure respect for one's self and property, but 
1. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, THE Rise AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); G. GIL-
MORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1973). 
2. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 526 (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888). 
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also to assure that others would serve one's own purposes (p. 8). Moreover, 
this assurance, when derived from the "conviction" that others will do what 
is "right," gave birth to trust, which thereafter became a "powerful tool for 
our working our mutual wills in the world" (p. 8). Fried sees this moral 
discovery, and the consequent development of trust, as the very foundation 
of promissory, and therefore contractual, obligation. 
Promise, according to Fried, is the device by which trust is given its 
"sharpest, most palpable form" (p. 8). Promise gives us the means to ac-
complish our will through a moral power alone. Promise transforms a 
choice that was once morally neutral into one that is morally compelled, 
permitting us to gain the cooperation of others to achieve our purposes. 
Promise implies more than a communication of intention (which we are 
free to change, though others may be injured); it implies a commitment to a 
future course of conduct. A mere promise commits a person to future ac-
tion, Fried asserts, because promising is a "general convention" (p. 13). 
· That is, since without a way of binding people to future conduct, all trans-
actions would have to be present exchanges, people find it useful to accept 
the presumption that promises have force in general, and apply this conven-
tional understanding to particular cases. Promising is thus an institution; it 
exists on the same structural level as games or language (pp. 11-14). 
Fried rejects the view that a person becomes morally obligated to keep 
his promises merely because of external sanctions, self-interest, or consider-
ations of utility3 (pp. 15- 16). Instead, Fried posits that an individual is 
morally bound to keep a specific promise because he has intentionally in-
voked the general convention of promising - a convention whose sole 
function is to give to the promisee moral gounds to expect the promised 
performance. It is simply wrong, Fried asserts, to invoke that convention in 
order to secure a promise, and then to break the promise. One thereby 
betrays the trust and the respect for individual autonomy upon which the 
convention was founded. Furthermore, because a contract "is first of all a 
promise, the contract must be kept because a promise must be kept" (p. 17). 
Fried thus arrives at this explanation of the origin of contractual obliga-
tion via a linear path strewn with a few rather bare assertions: From the 
morality of liberal individualism, to the crucial discovery that morality 
could be used to achieve one's own ends, to the development of trust, and 
finally, to the genesis of promising as a convention, he derives the legal 
institution of contract. 
Fried then bolsters his conceptual framework of contract law by using it 
to illuminate concrete areas within the field. While plausible enough in the 
discussion of consideration and offer and acceptance principles, this exposi-
tion falters significantly regarding the important issue of damages. Fried 
casually endorses the expectations measure of contract damages in prefer-
ence to the reliance measure, because "if a person is bound by his promise 
and not by the harm the promisee may have suffered in reliance on it, then 
what he is bound to is just its performance" (p. 19) (emphasis added). But 
contract law, modem or classical, does not entitle the promisee to perform-
3. Fried necessarily rejects the view, associated with Patrick Atiyah and Grant Gilmore, 
that tort and restitution of benefit principles are the foundation of contract law. See note 1 
supra. 
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ance, only to damages. By contrast, Posner offers an elegant and compre-
hensive explanation of contract remedies based on economic efficiency.4 In 
Fried's view, breaking an inefficient contract is morally wrong - yet the 
legal system, by allowing only damages for most contract claims, clearly 
encourages the breach of inefficient contracts. At least with respect to dam-
age, then, other considerations appear to have superseded the promise prin-
ciple in the development of contract law. 
Fried makes his most interesting contributions to neoclassical contract 
theory when he analyzes the sources of contractual obligation, rather than 
the remedies for breach. This original and impressive discussion focuses on 
"things gone wrong" in the "promissory regime" (p. 56). In such cases, "the 
promissory principle either does not apply at all or must compete with rival 
moral principles" (p. 56). Here Fried makes his most noteworthy contribu-
tion to classical contract theory and his most significant concession to post-
classical theory. 
Fried begins his examination of "gaps" in the contracting process by 
discussing mistake, impossibility and frustration.5 Observing that in all 
three cases, the parties to a contract "though they [seem] to have agreed, 
have not agreed in fact" (p. 59), Fried points out that these cases cannot be 
resolved on the basis of any agreement or promise. To resolve disputes 
emanating from such imperfect contracting, courts must look to principles 
external to the will of the parties. Fried, however, does not advocate resort 
to the classicists' pseudo-interpretive devices of "presumed intent" (p. 60) or 
the "so-called objective standard of interpretation" (p. 6 I). Instead, Fried 
would consult "residual general principles of law" (p. 69), such as the tort 
principle of compensation for harm done, the principle of restitution of 
benefits conferred, and a third "distinct" principle of sharing {pp. 69-73). 6 
This last principle is itself a residual of the other two residual principles: it 
arises only where no agreement obtains, where no one in the relationship is 
at fault, and where no one has conferred a benefit - in short ''where there 
are no rights to respect" (p. 71). 
The doctrines of duress and unconscionability pose a dilemma for 
Fried, since they release parties from obligations which they knowingly ac-
cepted, and which do constitute an agreement. Fried's response, if less flex-
ible than recent reformers might approve, is resourceful and consistent. He 
first examines duress, a vice in the contracting process itself. Duress entails 
a threat to do wrong to the promisor and thus a threat to violate the prom-
isor's rights. Any contract entered into on such a basis, Fried maintains, is 
without moral force. Thus, its rescission wholly accords with his theory. 
4. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§§ 4.12-4.19 (1977). A further element in 
Posner's discussion is the relationship between the duty to mitigate damages and efficiency. 
Fried can offer no better explanation of mitigation than to describe the obligation to mitigate 
as "a kind of altruistic duty." P. 131. 
5. Mistake, according to Fried, "relates to a false assumption about how things are at the 
time of contracting" while frustration and impossibility "relate to incorrect assumptions about 
how things will be later, when it comes time to perform." P. 58. 
6. Fried analyzes the doctrine of good faith, defined as "honesty in fact," p. 77, in similar 
fashion. That is, when parties do not enter a contract on the basis of "mutual intelligibility," 
interpretation may fail to produce a "core of agreement," and courts must again rely on princi-
ples of resolution outside the law of contract. Pp. 85-90. 
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Next, Fried considers the concepts of procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability.7 Fried views procedural unconscionability as a cognitive flaw 
in the process of contracting, akin to the doctrine of mistake. He thus views 
gap-filling as an appropriate response. By contrast, he does not consider 
substantive unconscionability to be a proper subject for nonpromissory 
principles. Unless either a discrete market8 or society as a whole9 malfunc-
tions, a court improperly engages in social redistribution when it displaces 
contracts that appear to be unfair in substance and effect. Fried would pre-
fer a laissez-faire approach and the individual hardships that might result, 
over the court's application of collective or paternalistic values to override 
contracts into which the parties freely entered. Society can pursue its redis-
tributive goals through taxation and the welfare system, Fried maintains, 
but courts should not allow these goals to muddy the waters of contract law 
or threaten the moral basis of the promissory principle. 
Throughout his book, Fried remains faithful both to the classical or 
"will theory" of contract law and to the primacy of the promissory principle 
within that theory. Fried's unique contribution to the classicists' theory lies 
in his stimulating and undogmatic approach to the criticisms of that theory. 
That is, Fried accepts the fact that the promissory principle is not the exclu-
sive guiding light for the resolution of contractual disputes. Where gap-
.filling is necessary Fried would agree with the post-classicists that tradi-
tional contract law is insufficient, and would apply noncontractual princi-
ples of law. After making this significant concession to the post-classicists, 
the impact ofFried's promissory approach is limited to cases for which gap-
.filling is unnecessary or inappropriate. In (perhaps) the vast majority of 
cases, in which the parties clearly have agreed, both the postclassicists and 
Fried would enforce the promise. Where the contracting process has bro-
ken down to the extent that there is no agreement in fact, Fried would rely 
on the same "residual" principles oflaw invoked by the postclassicists (with 
the possible exception of Fried's sharing principle). Only in those cases in 
which there is a meaningful promise that can be enforced, but for which the 
postclassicists would award less than full expectation damages (e.g. , sub-
stantive unconscionability), would Fried's approach seem to argue for a dif-
ferent result. The smaller the percentage of such cases, the less important is 
the role of Fried's promissory principle.10 
Still, Fried's book makes an important contribution to the theory of 
7. Fried directs the reader to Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: 17ze Emperor's New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rev. 485 (1967), for the distinction there introduced between procedural 
and substantive unconscionability. P. 151 n.l. Procedural unconscionability refers to uncon-
scionable methods of contracting, while substantive unconscionability refers to unconscionable 
effects of a contracting process which may otherwise be "conscionable." 
8. A market malfunctions when goods are not distributed efficiently - that is, when ex-
changes can be made which will make both parties better off, but fail to take place because of 
transaction or information costs. The paradigm case presented here is Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 16 A.2d 69 (1960) (Automobile Manufacturers Association's 
attempted disclaimer of implied warranty of merchantability held inimical to public good and 
therefore invalid). P. 152 n.26. 
9. Examples include shipwrecks on the high seas or chaotic conditions inhering in war-tom 
societies. 
IO. See Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. Rev. 509, 515-16 (1981). 
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contract law. Fried's critics may reevaluate their theories and consider 
anew the viability of the promissory principle within at least some of the 
vast terrain covered by the law of contracts. Students will find that the 
book presents a clear and unifying picture of contract law. Many of the 
cases one is most likely to encounter in a first year contracts course are 
placed within Fried's conceptual framework. The discussion of these cases 
will enable the student to place them within the larger context of contract 
theory. Finally, although of little practical utility to nonacademic attor-
neys, Fried's book is readable, thought-provoking, and sure to provide an 
afternoon of pleasurable musing on the origin of contract law in the prom-
issory principle. I I 
11. Fried's book has also been reviewed by Atiyah,supra noti: 10; Kronman,A New Cham-
pion for the Will Theory (Book Review), 91 YALE L.J. 404 (1981); Book Review, 92 ETHICS S86 
(1982). 
